troops consisted of 368 battalions, 252 squadrons, and 984 guns. The
strength of the entire army on peace footing was 393,000 men; on war
footing, 567,000. Disasters followed one another in rapid succession,
and the bulk of this war-trained long-service army was captive in
Germany within three months of the opening battle. But the spirit of the
nation rose to the occasion as it had done in 1793. The next year's
contingent of recruits was called out and hastily trained. Fourth
battalions were formed from the depot cadres, and organized into
_regiments de marche_. The _gardes mobiles_ (Niel's creation) were
mobilized, and by successive decrees and under various names nearly all
the manhood of the country called to arms.
The regular troops raised as _regiments de marche_, &c., amounted to
213,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and 10,000 artillery. The _garde
mobile_ exceeded 300,000, and the mobilized national guard exceeded
1,100,000--of whom about 180,000 were actually in the field and 250,000
in Paris; the remainder preparing themselves in camps or depots for
active work. Altogether the new formations amounted to nearly 1,700,000.
Though, in the face of the now war-experienced well-led and disciplined
Germans, their efforts failed, this cannot detract from the admiration
which must be felt by every soldier for the patriotism of the people and
the creative energy of their leaders, of whom Gambetta and Freycinet
were the chief. After the war every Frenchman set himself to solve the
army problem not less seriously than had every Prussian after Jena, and
the reformed French army (see FRANCE) was the product of the period of
national reconstruction. The adoption of the "universal service"
principle of active army, reserves and second-line troops, the essential
feature of which is the _line_ training of every man, was almost as a
matter of course the basis of the reorganization, for the want of a
trained reserve was the most obvious cause of the disasters of "the
terrible year."
GERMAN ARMY