conscription, but it had again to be resorted to within three years. In
1818 the annual contingent was fixed at 40,000, and the period of
service at six years; in 1824 the contingent was increased to 60,000,
and in 1832 to 80,000. Of this, however, a part only, according to the
requirements of the service, were enrolled; the remainder were sent home
on leave or furlough. Up to 1855 certain exemptions were authorized, and
substitution or exchange of lots amongst young men who had drawn was
permitted, but the individual drawn was obliged either to serve
personally or find a substitute. The long series of Algerian wars
produced further changes, and in 1855 the law of "dotation" or exemption
by payment was passed, and put an end to personal substitution. The
state now undertook to provide substitutes for all who paid a fixed sum,
and did so by high bounties to volunteers or to soldiers for
re-engaging. Although the price of exemption was fixed as high as L92,
on an average 23,000 were claimed annually, and in 1859 as many as
42,000 were granted. Thus gradually the conscription became rather
subsidiary to voluntary enlistment, and in 1866, out of a total
establishment of 400,000, only 120,000 were conscripts. Changes had also
taken place in the constitution of the army. On the Restoration its
numbers were reduced to 150,000, the old regiments broken up and recast,
and a royal guard created in place of the old imperial one. When the
revolution of July 1830 had driven Charles X. from his throne, the royal
guard, which had made itself peculiarly obnoxious, was dissolved; and
during Louis Philippe's reign the army was augmented to about 240,000
with the colours. Under the Provisional Government of 1848 it was
further increased, and in 1854, when France allied herself with England
against Russia, the army was raised to 500,000 men. The imperial guard
was re-created, and every effort made to revive the old Napoleonic
traditions in the army. In 1859 Napoleon III. took the field as the
champion and ally of Italy, and the victories of Montebello, Magenta and
Solferino raised the reputation of the army to the highest pitch, and
for a time made France the arbiter of Europe. But the campaign of 1866
suddenly made the world aware that a rival military power had arisen,
which was prepared to dispute that supremacy.
Marshal Niel (q.v.), the then war minister, saw clearly that the
organization which had with difficulty maintained 150,000 men in Italy,
was no match for that which had within a month thrown 250,000 into the
very heart of Austria, while waging a successful war on the Main against
Bavaria and her allies. In 1867, therefore, he brought forward a measure
for the reorganization of the army. This was to have been a true "nation
in arms" based on universal service, and Niel calculated upon producing
a first-line army 800,000 strong--half with the colours, half in
reserve--with a separate army of the second line. But many years must
elapse before the full effect of this principle of recruiting can be
produced, as the army is incomplete in some degree until the oldest
reservist is a man who has been through the line training. Niel himself
died within a year, and 1870 witnessed the complete ruin of the French
army. The law of 1868 remained therefore no more than an expression of
principle.