by a national surrender so abject as to prove conclusively the eternal
truth, that a divorce of armies from national interests is completely
fatal to national well-being. But the oppression of the victors soon
began to produce a spirit of ardent patriotism which, carefully directed
by a small band of able soldiers, led in the end to a national uprising
of a steadier and more lasting kind than that of the French Revolution.
Prussia was compelled, by the rigorous treaty of peace, to keep a small
force only under arms, and circumstances thus drove her into the path of
military development which she subsequently followed. The stipulation of
the treaty was evaded by the _Krumper_ system, by which men were passed
through the ranks as hastily as possible and dismissed to the reserve,
their places being taken by recruits. The regimental establishments were
therefore mere _cadres_, and the _personnel_, recruited by universal
service with few exemptions, ever-changing. This system depended on the
willingness of the reserves to come up when called upon, and the
arrogance of the French was quite sufficient to ensure this. The
_denouement_ of the Napoleonic wars came too swiftly for the full
development of the armed strength of Prussia on these lines; and at the
outbreak of the Wars of Liberation a newly formed _Landwehr_ and
numerous volunteer corps took the field with no more training than the
French had had in 1793. Still, the principles of universal service
(_allgemeine Wehrpflicht_) and of the army reserve were, for the first
time in modern history, systematically put into action, and modern
military development has concerned itself more with the consolidation of
the _Krumper_ system than with the creation of another. The debut of the
new Prussian army was most unsuccessful, for Napoleon had now attained
the highest point of soldierly skill, and managed to inflict heavy
defeats on the allies. But the Prussians were not discouraged; like the
French in 1793 they took to broken ground, and managed to win combats
against all leaders opposed to them except Napoleon himself. The Russian
army formed a solid background for the Prussians, and in the end Austria
joined the coalition. Reconstituted on modern lines, the Austrian army
in 1813, except in the higher leading, was probably the best-organized
on the continent. After three desperate campaigns the Napoleonic regime
came to an end, and men felt that there would be no such struggle again
in their lifetime. Military Europe settled down into grooves along which
it ran until 1866. France, exhausted of its manhood, sought a field for
military activities in colonial wars waged by long-service troops. The
conscription was still in force, but the citizens served most
unwillingly, and substitution produced a professional army, which as
usual became a dynastic tool. Austria, always menaced with foreign war
and internal disorder, maintained the best army in Europe. The British
army, though employed far differently, retained substantially the
Peninsular system.