Strelitz (q.v.) by Peter the Great in 1698, the nucleus of the new
forces being four regiments of foot, two of which are well known to-day
under their old titles of Preobrazhenski and Semenovski. Throughout the
18th century Russian military progress obeyed successive dynasties of
western European models--first those of Prussia, then those of France.
In the earlier part of the 19th century the army, used chiefly in wars
against the revolutionary spirit, became, like others of that time, a
dynastic force; subsequently the "nation in arms" principle reasserted
itself, and on this basis has been carried out the reorganization of
Russia's military power. The enormous development of this since 1874 is
one of the most striking phenomena in recent military history. In 1892,
in expectation of a general European war, whole armies were massed in
the districts of Warsaw and Vilna, three-fifths of the entire forces
being in position on the German and Austrian frontiers.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 is generally held to have proved that
the fighting power of the Russian has in no way diminished in
intrinsic value from that of the days of Zorndorf, Borodino and
Sevastopol. The proverbial stubbornness of the rank and file is the
distinctive quality of the armies of the tsar, and in view of the
general adoption of two-years' service in other countries it is a
matter for grave consideration whether, against European forces and in
defence of their own homes, the Russians would not prove more than
formidable antagonists to the men of more highly individualized races
who are their probable opponents. Equally remarkable is the new power
of redistribution possessed by Russia. Formerly it was usual to count
upon one campaign at least elapsing before Russia could intervene
effectively in European wars; much, in fact the greater part, of her
losses in the Crimean War was due to the enormous distances which had
to be traversed on foot. Nowadays the original equal distribution of
the army over the country has been modified in accordance with the
political needs of each moment. In 1892 the centre of gravity was
shifted to Poland and Kiev, in 1904 the performances of the
trans-Siberian railway in transporting troops to the seat of war in
Manchuria excited the admiration of military Europe. The attitude of
the army in the troubles which followed upon the Japanese War belongs
to the history of Russia, not to that of military organization, and it
will be sufficient to say that the conduct of the "nation in arms" at
times of political unrest may vary between the extremes of
unquestioning obedience to authority and the most dangerous form of
licence, examples of both being frequent in the history of nearly all
national armies. A remarkable innovation in the modern history of this
army is the conversion of the whole of the cavalry, except a few
_elite_ regiments, into dragoons of the old type. After the war of
1904-5, however, this policy was reversed and the cavalry reformed on
the usual model. The Cossacks still retain to a large extent the
peculiarities of the light troops of the 18th century.
SPANISH ARMY