above does not, in France, imply the supreme command, which would be
exercised by the minister of war in Paris. The German system, on the
other hand, is based upon the leadership of the national forces by the
sovereign in person, and even though the headquarters of the "supreme
war lord" (_Oberste Kriegsherr_) are actually in the field in one
theatre of operations, he directs the movements of the German armies in
all quarters. Similarly, in 1864, General Grant accompanied and
controlled as a "group" the Armies of the Potomac and the James,
supervising at the same time the operations of other groups and armies.
In the same campaign a subordinate general, Sherman, commanded a "group"
consisting of the Armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland and the Ohio.
The question as to whether the supreme command and the command of the
principal group of armies should be in the same hands is very difficult
of solution. In practice, the method adopted in each case usually grows
out of the military and political conditions. The advantage of the
German method is that the supreme commander is in actual contact with
the troops, and can therefore form an accurate judgment of their powers.
Under these conditions the risk of having cabinet strategy forced upon
the generals is at its minimum, and more especially so if the supreme
commander is the head of the state. On the other hand, his judgment is
very liable to be influenced unduly by facts, coming under his own
notice, which may in reality have no more than a local significance.
Further, the supreme commander is at the mercy of distant subordinates
to a far greater degree than he would be if free to go from one army to
another. Thus, in 1870 the king of Prussia's headquarters before Paris
were subjected to such pressure from subordinate army commanders that on
several occasions selected staff-officers had to be sent to examine, for
the king's private information, the real state of things at the front.
The conduct of operations by one group commander in the campaign of 1864
seemed, at a distance, so eccentric and dangerous that General Grant
actually left his own group of armies and went in person to take over
command at the threatened point. Balanced judgment is thus often
impossible unless the supreme command is independent of, and in a
position to exercise general supervision over, each and every group or
army. At the other end of the scale is the system of command employed by
the Turks in 1877, in which four armies, three of them being actually on
the same theatre of war, were directed from Constantinople. This system
may be condemned unreservedly. It is recognized that, once the armies on
either side have become seriously engaged, a commander-in-chief on the
spot must direct them. Thus in 1904, while the Japanese and Russian
armies were under the supreme command of their respective sovereigns,
General Kuropatkin and Marshal Oyama personally commanded the chief
groups of armies in the field. This is substantially the same as the
system of the French army. It is therefore permissible to regard the
system pursued by the Germans in 1870, and by the Union government in
1864, more as suited to special circumstances than as a general rule. As
has been said above, the special feature of the German system of command
is the personal leadership of the German emperor, and this brings the
student at once to the consideration of another important part of the
"superior leading."