the first imparted to the new organizations by the results of the Thirty
Years' War. A well-founded horror of military barbarity had the effect
of separating the soldier from the civilian by an impassable gulf. The
drain of thirty years on the population, resources and finances of
almost every country in middle Europe, everywhere limited the size of
the new armies; and the decision in 1648 of all questions save those of
dynastic interest dictated the nature of their employment. The best
soldiers of the time pronounced in favour of small field armies, for in
the then state of communications and agriculture large forces proved in
practice too cumbrous for good work. In every country, therefore, the
army took the form of a professional body, nearly though not quite
independent of extra recruits for war, set apart entirely from all
contact with civil life, rigidly restricted as to conduct in peace and
war, and employed mostly in the "maintenance" of their superiors'
private quarrels. Iron discipline produced splendid tenacity in action,
and wholesale desertion at all times. In the Seven Years' War, for
instance, the Austrians stated one-fifth of their total loss as due to
desertion, and Thackeray's _Barry Lyndon_ gives no untrue picture of the
life of a soldier under the old regime. Further, since men were costly,
rigid economy of their lives in action, and minute care for their
feeding and shelter on the march, occupied a disproportionate amount of
the attention of their generals. Armies necessarily moved slowly and
remained concentrated to facilitate supply and to check desertion, and
thus, when a commander had every unit of his troops within a short ride
of his headquarters, there was little need for intermediate general
officers, and still less for a highly trained staff.