military organization at the time when it was put to the severe test of
the Second Punic War. Its elements were good, its military skill
superior to that of any other army of ancient history, while its
organization was on the whole far better than any that had gone before.
The handy formation of maniples at open order was unique in the ancient
world, and it did not reappear in history up to the advent of Gustavus
Adolphus. In this formation, in which everything was entrusted to the
skill of subordinates and the individual courage of the rank and file,
the Romans met and withstood with success every type of impact, from the
ponderous shock of the Macedonian phalanx and the dangerous rush of
Celtic savages to the charge of elephants. Yet it was no particular
virtue in the actual form employed that carried the Roman arms to so
many victories. There would have been positive danger in thus
articulating the legion had it been composed of any but the most
trustworthy soldiers. To swiftness and precision of manoeuvre they added
a dogged obstinacy over which nothing but overwhelming disaster
prevailed. It is, therefore, not unnatural to ask wherein the system
which produced these soldiers failed, as it did within a century after
the battle of Zama. The greatest defect was the want of a single
military command. The civil magistrates of Rome were _ex officio_
leaders of her armies, and though no Roman officer lacked military
training, the views of a consul or praetor were almost invariably
influenced by the programme of his political party. When, as sometimes
happened, the men under their command sided in the political differences
of their leaders, all real control came to an end. The soldiers of the
Republic hardly ever forgot that they were citizens with voting powers;
they served as a rule only during a campaign; and, while there could be
little question as to their patriotism and stubbornness, they lacked
almost entirely that _esprit de corps_ which is found only amongst the
members of a body having a permanent corporate existence. Thus they had
the vices as well as the virtues of a nation in arms, and they fell
still further short of the ideal because of the dubious and precarious
tenure of their generals' commands. The great officers were usually sent
home at the end of a campaign, to be replaced by their elected
successors, and they showed all the hesitation and fear of
responsibility usually found in a temporary commander. Above all, when
two armies, each under its own consul or praetor, acted together, the
command was either divided or exercised on alternate days.