that of the attack, must, of course, act according to circumstances. We
are here concerned not with the absolute strength or weakness of the
passive defensive, which is a matter of tactics (q.v.), but with the
tactical procedure of artillery, which, relatively to other methods, is
held to offer the best chance of success, so far as success is
attainable. On the defensive in a prepared position, which in European
warfare at any rate will be an unusually favourable case for the
defender--the guns have two functions, that of engaging and holding the
hostile artillery, and that of meeting the infantry assault. The dilemma
is this, that on the one hand a position in rear of the line of battle,
with modern improvements in communicating and indirect laying apparatus,
is well suited for engaging the hostile guns, but not for meeting the
assault; and on the other, guns on the forward slope of the defender's
ridge or hill can fire direct, but are quickly located and overwhelmed,
for they can hardly remain silent while their own infantry bears the
fire of the assailant's shrapnel. Thus the defender's guns would, as a
rule, have to be divided. One portion would seek to fight from rearward
concealed positions, and use every device to delay the victory of the
enemy's guns and the development of the battle until it is too late in
the day for a serious infantry attack. Further, the enemy's mistakes and
the "fortune of war" may give opportunities of inflicting severe losses;
such opportunities have always occurred and will do so again. In the
possible (though very far from probable) case of the defender not merely
baffling, but crushing his opponent in the artillery duel, he may, if he
so desires, himself assume the role of assailant, and at any rate he
places a veto on the enemy's attack.
The portion told off to meet the infantry assault would be entrenched on
the forward slope and would take no part in the artillery duel. Very
exceptionally, this advanced artillery might fire upon favourable
targets, but its paramount duty is to remain intact for the decisive
moment. Here again the defender is confronted with grave difficulties.
It is true that his advanced batteries may be of the greatest possible
assistance at the crisis of the infantry assault, yet even so the
covering fire of the hostile guns, as soon as the hostile infantry had
found them their target, may be absolutely overwhelming; moreover, once
the fight has begun, the guns cannot be withdrawn, nor can their
positions easily be modified to meet unexpected developments. The
proportion of the whole artillery force which should be committed to the
forward position is disputed. Colonel Bethell (_Journal Royal
Artillery_, vol. xxxiii. p. 67) holds that all the mountain guns, and
two-thirds of the field guns, should be in the forward, all the
howitzers and heavy guns and one-third of the field guns in the retired
position. But in view of the facts that if once the advanced guns are
submerged in the tide of the enemy's assault, they will be
irrecoverable, and that a modern Q.F. gun, with plenty of ammunition at
hand, may use "rapid fire" freely, artillery opinion, as a whole, is in
favour of having fewer guns and an abnormal ammunition supply in the
forward entrenchments, and the bulk of the artillery (with the
ammunition columns at hand) in rear. But the purely passive defensive is
usually but a preliminary to an active counter-stroke. This
counter-attack would naturally be supported to the utmost by the
offensive tactics of the artillery, which might thus at the end of a
battle achieve far greater results than it could have done at the
beginning of the day. In _pursuit_, it is universally agreed that the
action of the artillery may be bold to the verge of rashness. The
employment of field artillery in _advanced_ and _rear guard actions_
varies almost indefinitely according to circumstances; with _outposts_,
guns would only be employed exceptionally.