have been dealt with in considering the advantages and disadvantages of
the several forms of recruiting. It only remains to give some indication
of the advantages which such forces (irrespective of their time of
service) possess over troops which only come up for training at
intervals. Physically, the men with the colours are always superior to
the rest, owing to their constant exercise and the regularity and order
under which they live; as soldiers, they are more under the control of
their officers, who are their leaders in daily life, in closer touch
with army methods and discipline, and, as regards their formal training,
they possess infinitely greater power of strategic and tactical
manoeuvre. Their steadiness under fire is of course more to be relied
upon than that of other troops. Wellington, speaking of the contrast
between old and young soldiers (regulars), was of opinion that the chief
difference lay in the greater hardiness, power of endurance, and general
campaigning qualities given by experience. This is of course more than
ever true in respect of regular and auxiliary troops, as was strikingly
demonstrated in the Spanish-American War. On the whole, it is true to
say that only a regular army can endure defeat without dissolution, and
that volunteers, reservists or militiamen fresh from civil life may win
a victory but cannot make the fullest use of it when won. At the same
time, when they have been through one or two arduous campaigns, raw
troops become to all intents and purposes equal to any regulars. On the
other hand, the greatest military virtue of auxiliary forces is their
enthusiasm. With this quality were won the great victories of 1792-94 in
France, those of 1813 in Germany, and the beginnings of Italian unity at
Calatafimi and Palermo. The earlier days of the American Civil War
witnessed desperate fighting, of which Shiloh is the best example,
between armies which had had but the slightest military training. In the
same war the first battle of Bull Run illustrated what has been said
above as to the weaknesses of unprofessional armies. Both sides, raw and
untrained, fought for a long time with the greatest determination, after
which the defeated army was completely dissolved in rout and the victors
quite unable to pursue. So far it is the relative military value of the
professional soldier and the citizen-soldier that has been reviewed. A
continental army of the French or German stamp is differently
constituted. It is, first of all, clear that the drilled citizen-soldier
combines the qualities of training and enthusiasm. From this it follows
that a hostile "feeling" as well as a hostile "view" must animate such
an army if it is to do good service. If a modern "nation in arms" is
engaged in a purely dynastic quarrel against a professional army of
inferior strength, the result will probably be victory for the latter.
But the active army of France or Germany constitutes but a small part of
the "nation in arms," and the army for war is composed in addition of
men who have at some period in the past gone through a regular training.
Herein lies the difference between continental and British auxiliary
forces. In the French army, an ex-soldier during his ten years of
reserve service was by the law of 1905 only liable for two months'
training, and for the rest of his military career for two weeks' service
only. The further reduction of this liability was proposed in 1907 and
led to much controversy. The question of the value of auxiliary forces,
then, as between the continuous work of, say, English territorials, and
the permanent though dwindling influence of an original period of active
soldiering, is one of considerable importance. It is largely decided in
any given case by the average age of the men in the ranks.