artillery becomes the history of its technical effectiveness,
particularly in relation to infantry fire, and of improvements or
modifications in the method of putting well-recognized principles into
action. Infantry fire, however, being more variable in its effectiveness
than that of artillery, the period 1815-1870 saw many changes in the
relations of the two arms. In the time of Napoleon, infantry fire never
equalled that of the Seven Years' War, and after the period of the great
wars the musket was less and less effectively used. Economy was,
however, practised to excess in every army of Europe during the period
1815-1850, and even if there had been great battles at this time, the
artillery, which was maintained on a minimum strength of guns, men and
horses, would not have repeated the exploits of Senarmont and Drouot in
the Napoleonic wars. The principle was well understood, but under such
conditions the practice was impossible. It was at this stage that the
general introduction of the rifled musket put an end, once for all,
to the artillery tactics of the smooth-bore days. Infantry, armed with a
far-ranging rifle, as in the American Civil War, kept the guns beyond
case-shot range, compelling them to use only round shot or common shell.
In that war, therefore, attacking infantry met, on reaching close
quarters, not regiments already broken by a _feu d'enfer_, but the full
force of the defenders' artillery and infantry, both arms fresh and
unshaken, and the full volume of their case shot and musketry. At
Fredericksburg the Federal infantry attacked, unsupported by a single
field piece; at Gettysburg the Federal artillery general Hunt was able
to reserve his ammunition to meet Lee's assault, although the infantry
of his own side was meanwhile subjected to the fire of 137 Confederate
guns. Thus, in both these cases the assault became one of infantry
against unshaken infantry and artillery. On many occasions, indeed, the
batteries on either side went into close ranges, as the traditions of
the old United States army dictated, but their losses were then totally
out of proportion to their effectiveness. Indeed, the increased range at
which battles were now fought, and the ineffectiveness of the
projectiles necessarily used by the artillery at these ranges, so far
neutralized even rifled guns that artillery generals could speak of
"idle cannonades" as the "besetting sin" of some commanders.