regulated system of conscription, which was "preached in every pulpit in
Sweden." There were indeed enlisted regiments of the usual type, and it
would seem that Gustavus obtained the best even of the soldiers of
fortune. But the national regiments were raised on the _Indelta_ system.
Each officer and man, under this scheme, received a land grant within
the territorial district of his corps, and each of these districts
supplied recruits in numbers proportionate to its population. This
curious mixture of feudal and modern methods produced the best elements
of an army, which, aided by the tactical and technical improvements
introduced by Gustavus, proved itself incomparably superior to its
rivals. Of course the long and bloody campaigns of 1630-34 led to the
admission of great numbers of mercenaries even into the Swedish corps;
and German, Scottish and other regiments figured largely, not only in
the armies of Duke Bernhard and his successors, but in the army of
Gustavus' own lifetime. As early as 1632 one brigade of the army was
distinguished by the title "Swedish," as alone containing no foreigners.
Yet the framework was much the same as it had been in 1630. The
battle-organization of two lines and two wings, which was typical of the
later "linear" tactics, began to supplant the system of the _tercios_.
How cumbrous the latter had become by 1630 may be judged from any
battle-plan of the period, and notably from that of Lutzen. Gustavus'
cavalry fought four or three deep only, and depended as little as
possible on the pistol. The work of riding down the pikes was indeed
rendered easier by the improved tactical handiness of the musketeers,
but it was fiery leading which alone compelled victory, for there were
relatively few Swedish horse and many squadrons of Germans and others,
who in themselves were far less likely to charge boldly than the
"Pappenheimers" and other crack corps of the enemy. The infantry was of
the highest class, and only on that condition could loose and supple
lines be trusted to oppose the solid _tercios_ of Tilly and Wallenstein.
Cumbrous indeed these were, but by long practice they had acquired no
small manoeuvring power, of which Breitenfeld affords a striking
example. The Swedes, however, completely surpassed them. The progress
thus made may be gauged from the fact that under Gustavus the largest
closed body of infantry was less than 300 strong. Briefly, the genius of
a great commander, the ardour of a born cavalry leader, better arms and
better organization, carried the Swedes to the end of their career of
victory, but how personal was the _vis viva_ which inspired the army was
quickly noticeable after the death of Gustavus. Even a Bernhard could,
in the end, evoke no more heroism from a Swedish army than from any
other, and the real Swedish troops fought their last battle at
Nordlingen (1634). After this, little distinguished the "Swedish" forces
from the general mass of the armies of the time, save their system, to
which, and to its influence on the training of such leaders as Baner,
Torstensson and Wrangel, all their later victories were due. So much of
Gustavus' work survived even the carnage of Nordlingen, and his system
always obtained better results, even with the heterogeneous troops of
this later period, than any other of the time.