opening of the new period of development is that of the French army in
Italy in 1494, written by Paolo Giovio. He notes with surprise that the
various corps of infantry and cavalry are distinct, the usual practice
of the time being to combine one lancer, one archer, one groom, &c.,
into a small unit furnished and commanded by the lancer. There were
Swiss and German infantry, armed with pike and halbert, with a few
"shot," who marched in good order to music. There were the heavy
men-at-arms (_gendarmes_), accompanied as of old by mounted archers,
who, however, now fought independently. There were, further, Gascon
slingers and crossbowmen, who had probably acquired, from contact with
Spain, some of the lightness and dash of their neighbours. The artillery
train was composed of 140 heavy pieces and a great number of lighter
guns; these were then and for many generations thereafter a special arm
outside the military establishments (see ARTILLERY). In all this the
only relic of the days of Crecy is the administrative combination of the
men-at-arms and the horse archers, and even this is no longer practised
in action. The most important element in the army is the heavy infantry
of Swiss and Germans. The Swiss had for a century past gradually
developed into the most formidable troops of the day. The wars of Zizka
(q.v.) in Bohemia (1420) materially assisted in the downfall of the
heavy cavalry; and the victories of the Swiss, beginning with Sempach
(1382), had by 1480 proved that their solid battalions, armed with the
long pike and the halberd, were practically invulnerable to all but
missile and shock action combined. By fortune of war, they never met the
English, who had shown the way to deal with the _schiltron_ as early as
Falkirk. So great was their confidence against ordinary troops, that on
one occasion (1444) they detached 1600 men to engage 50,000. It was
natural that a series of victories such as Granson, Morat and Nancy
should place them in the forefront of the military nations of Europe.
The whole people devoted itself thereupon to professional soldiering,
particularly in the French service, and though their monopoly of
mercenary employment lasted a short time only, they continued to furnish
regiments to the armies of France, Spain and the Pope up to the most
modern times. But their efficiency was thoroughly sapped by the growth
of a mutinous and insubordinate spirit, the memory of which has survived
in the proverb _Point d'argent, point de Suisse_, and inspired
Machiavelli with the hatred of mercenaries which marks every page of his
work on the art of war. One of their devices for extorting money was to
appear at the muster with many more soldiers than had been contracted
for by their employers, who were forced to submit to this form of
blackmail. At last the French, tired of these caprices, inflicted on the
Swiss the crushing defeat of Marignan (q.v.), and their tactical system
received its death-blow from the Spaniards at Pavia (1525).