what the cause of the misery of the wicked._
Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found
to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is. And if we
ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not
unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken
Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no
such essence. And this vice, what else is it called than pride? For
"pride is the beginning of sin."[525] They were unwilling, then, to
preserve their strength for God; and as adherence to God was the
condition of their enjoying an ampler being, they diminished it by
preferring themselves to Him. This was the first defect, and the
first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature, which was
created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding its blessedness
in the enjoyment of the Supreme Being; whilst by abandoning Him it
should become, not indeed no nature at all, but a nature with a less
ample existence, and therefore wretched.
If the further question be asked, What was the efficient cause of
their evil will? there is none. For what is it which makes the will
bad, when it is the will itself which makes the action bad? And
consequently the bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing
is the efficient cause of the bad will. For if anything is the cause,
this thing either has or has not a will. If it has, the will is
either good or bad. If good, who is so left to himself as to say that
a good will makes a will bad? For in this case a good will would be
the cause of sin; a most absurd supposition. On the other hand, if
this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know what made it
so; and that we may not go on for ever, I ask at once, what made the
_first_ evil will bad? For that is not the first which was itself
corrupted by an evil will, but that is the first which was made
evil by no other will. For if it were preceded by that which made
it evil, that will was first which made the other evil. But if it
is replied, "Nothing made it evil; it always was evil," I ask if it
has been existing in some nature. For if not, then it did not exist
at all; and if it did exist in some nature, then it vitiated and
corrupted it, and injured it, and consequently deprived it of good.
And therefore the evil will could not exist in an evil nature, but
in a nature at once good and mutable, which this vice could injure.
For if it did no injury, it was no vice; and consequently the will
in which it was, could not be called evil. But if it did injury, it
did it by taking away or diminishing good. And therefore there could
not be from eternity, as was suggested, an evil will in that thing
in which there had been previously a natural good, which the evil
will was able to diminish by corrupting it. If, then, it was not from
eternity, who, I ask, made it? The only thing that can be suggested
in reply is, that something which itself had no will, made the will
evil. I ask, then, whether this thing was superior, inferior, or
equal to it? If superior, then it is better. How, then, has it no
will, and not rather a good will? The same reasoning applies if
it was equal; for so long as two things have equally a good will,
the one cannot produce in the other an evil will. Then remains the
supposition that that which corrupted the will of the angelic nature
which first sinned, was itself an inferior thing without a will. But
that thing, be it of the lowest and most earthly kind, is certainly
itself good, since it is a nature and being, with a form and rank of
its own in its own kind and order. How, then, can a good thing be the
efficient cause of an evil will? How, I say, can good be the cause
of evil? For when the will abandons what is above itself, and turns
to what is lower, it becomes evil--not because that is evil to which
it turns, but because the turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is
not an inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself
which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior
thing. For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see
the same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to
desire an illicit enjoyment, while the other stedfastly maintains a
modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it about,
that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other? What
produces it in the man in whom it exists? Not the bodily beauty,
for that was presented equally to the gaze of both, and yet did
not produce in both an evil will. Did the flesh of the one cause
the desire as he looked? But why did not the flesh of the other?
Or was it the disposition? But why not the disposition of both?
For we are supposing that both were of a like temperament of body
and soul. Must we, then, say that the one was tempted by a secret
suggestion of the evil spirit? As if it was not by his own will that
he consented to this suggestion and to any inducement whatever!
This consent, then, this evil will which he presented to the evil
suasive influence,--what was the cause of it, we ask? For, not to
delay on such a difficulty as this, if both are tempted equally, and
one yields and consents to the temptation, while the other remains
unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the matter than
this, that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from
chastity? And what causes this but their own wills, in cases at least
such as we are supposing, where the temperament is identical? The
same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret
temptation pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely we
examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the
will of the one to be evil. For if we say that the man himself made
his will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil but
a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good? Here are two men
who, before the temptation, were alike in body and soul, and of whom
one yielded to the tempter who persuaded him, while the other could
not be persuaded to desire that lovely body which was equally before
the eyes of both. Shall we say of the successfully tempted man that
he corrupted his own will, since he was certainly good before his
will became bad? Then, why did he do so? Was it because his will was
a nature, or because it was made of nothing? We shall find that the
latter is the case. For if a nature is the cause of an evil will,
what else can we say than that evil arises from good, or that good is
the cause of evil? And how can it come to pass that a nature, good
though mutable, should produce any evil--that is to say, should make
the will itself wicked?