seduce them to vice, but exercise their virtue._
We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the
doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding
these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may
rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate
and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we
do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is
angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness;
not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any
right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer
which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to
the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The
Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion.[336] But how
much more honourable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling
of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a
fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far
better, and more humane, and more consonant with pious sentiments,
are the words of Cicero in praise of Cæsar, when he says, "Among
your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your
compassion."[337] And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for
another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we can? And this
emotion is obedient to reason, when compassion is shown without
violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent
forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to
call this a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among
the vices, although, as the book of that eminent Stoic, Epictetus,
quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the
school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade
the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all
vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are not judged by
them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him
to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the opinion of
the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and the same.
But, as Cicero says,[338] mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful
Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However,
it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to these affections,
even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life?
For the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the
eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with
misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid
those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them
also these mental emotions, because, though they have none of our
weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions
move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry,
and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect
of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection.