also._
The remaining part of philosophy is morals, or what is called by the
Greeks ἠθική, in which is discussed the question concerning the chief
good,--that which will leave us nothing further to seek in order to
be blessed, if only we make all our actions refer to it, and seek it
not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. Therefore
it is called the end, because we wish other things on account of it,
but itself only for its own sake. This beatific good, therefore,
according to some, comes to a man from the body, according to others,
from the mind, and, according to others, from both together. For
they saw that man himself consists of soul and body; and therefore
they believed that from either of these two, or from both together,
their well-being must proceed, consisting in a certain final good,
which could render them blessed, and to which they might refer all
their actions, not requiring anything ulterior to which to refer that
good itself. This is why those who have added a third kind of good
things, which they call extrinsic,--as honour, glory, wealth, and the
like,--have not regarded them as part of the final good, that is, to
be sought after for their own sake, but as things which are to be
sought for the sake of something else, affirming that this kind of
good is good to the good, and evil to the evil. Wherefore, whether
they have sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, or
from both together, it is still only from man they have supposed that
it must be sought. But they who have sought it from the body have
sought it from the inferior part of man; they who have sought it from
the mind, from the superior part; and they who have sought it from
both, from the whole man. Whether, therefore, they have sought it
from any part, or from the whole man, still they have only sought it
from man; nor have these differences, being three, given rise only
to three dissentient sects of philosophers, but to many. For diverse
philosophers have held diverse opinions, both concerning the good of
the body, and the good of the mind, and the good of both together.
Let, therefore, all these give place to those philosophers who have
not affirmed that a man is blessed by the enjoyment of the body, or
by the enjoyment of the mind, but by the enjoyment of God,--enjoying
Him, however, not as the mind does the body or itself, or as one
friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys light, if, indeed, we
may draw any comparison between these things. But what the nature of
this comparison is, will, if God help me, be shown in another place,
to the best of my ability. At present, it is sufficient to mention
that Plato determined the final good to be to live according to
virtue, and affirmed that he only can attain to virtue who knows and
imitates God,--which knowledge and imitation are the only cause of
blessedness. Therefore he did not doubt that to philosophize is to
love God, whose nature is incorporeal. Whence it certainly follows
that the student of wisdom, that is, the philosopher, will then
become blessed when he shall have begun to enjoy God. For though he
is not necessarily blessed who enjoys that which he loves (for many
are miserable by loving that which ought not to be loved, and still
more miserable when they enjoy it), nevertheless no one is blessed
who does not enjoy that which he loves. For even they who love things
which ought not to be loved do not count themselves blessed by loving
merely, but by enjoying them. Who, then, but the most miserable will
deny that he is blessed, who enjoys that which he loves, and loves
the true and highest good? But the true and highest good, according
to Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a philosopher who
loves God; for philosophy is directed to the obtaining of the blessed
life, and he who loves God is blessed in the enjoyment of God.