interpreters, and whether they are deceived by them willingly,
or without their own knowledge._
But herein, no doubt, lies the great necessity for this absurdity, so
unworthy of the gods, that the ethereal gods, who are concerned about
human affairs, would not know what terrestrial men were doing unless
the aerial demons should bring them intelligence, because the ether
is suspended far away from the earth and far above it, but the air is
contiguous both to the ether and to the earth. O admirable wisdom!
what else do these men think concerning the gods who, they say, are
all in the highest degree good, but that they are concerned about
human affairs, lest they should seem unworthy of worship, whilst,
on the other hand, from the distance between the elements, they are
ignorant of terrestrial things? It is on this account that they have
supposed the demons to be necessary as agents, through whom the gods
may inform themselves with respect to human affairs, and through
whom, when necessary, they may succour men; and it is on account of
this office that the demons themselves have been held as deserving of
worship. If this be the case, then a demon is better known by these
good gods through nearness of body, than a man is by goodness of mind.
O mournful necessity! or shall I not rather say detestable and vain
error, that I may not impute vanity to the divine nature! For if the
gods can, with their minds free from the hindrance of bodies, see
our mind, they do not need the demons as messengers from our mind to
them; but if the ethereal gods, by means of their bodies, perceive the
corporeal indices of minds, as the countenance, speech, motion, and
thence understand what the demons tell them, then it is also possible
that they may be deceived by the falsehoods of demons. Moreover, if the
divinity of the gods cannot be deceived by the demons, neither can it
be ignorant of our actions. But I would they would tell me whether the
demons have informed the gods that the fictions of the poets concerning
the crimes of the gods displease Plato, concealing the pleasure which
they themselves take in them; or whether they have concealed both, and
have preferred that the gods should be ignorant with respect to this
whole matter, or have told both, as well the pious prudence of Plato
with respect to the gods as their own lust, which is injurious to the
gods; or whether they have concealed Plato's opinion, according to
which he was unwilling that the gods should be defamed with falsely
alleged crimes through the impious licence of the poets, whilst they
have not been ashamed nor afraid to make known their own wickedness,
which make them love theatrical plays, in which the infamous deeds of
the gods are celebrated. Let them choose which they will of these
four alternatives, and let them consider how much evil any one of
them would require them to think of the gods. For if they choose the
first, they must then confess that it was not possible for the good
gods to dwell with the good Plato, though he sought to prohibit things
injurious to them, whilst they dwelt with evil demons, who exulted
in their injuries; and this because they suppose that the good gods
can only know a good man, placed at so great a distance from them,
through the mediation of evil demons, whom they could know on account
of their nearness to themselves.[314] If they shall choose the second,
and shall say that both these things are concealed by the demons, so
that the gods are wholly ignorant both of Plato's most religious law
and the sacrilegious pleasure of the demons, what, in that case, can
the gods know to any profit with respect to human affairs through
these mediating demons, when they do not know those things which are
decreed, through the piety of good men, for the honour of the good
gods against the lust of evil demons? But if they shall choose the
third, and reply that these intermediary demons have communicated,
not only the opinion of Plato, which prohibited wrongs to be done to
the gods, but also their own delight in these wrongs, I would ask if
such a communication is not rather an insult? Now the gods, hearing
both and knowing both, not only permit the approach of those malign
demons, who desire and do things contrary to the dignity of the gods
and the religion of Plato, but also, through these wicked demons, who
are near to them, send good things to the good Plato, who is far away
from them; for they inhabit such a place in the concatenated series of
the elements, that they can come into contact with those by whom they
are accused, but not with him by whom they are defended,--knowing the
truth on both sides, but not being able to change the weight of the air
and the earth. There remains the fourth supposition; but it is worse
than the rest. For who will suffer it to be said that the demons have
made known the calumnious fictions of the poets concerning the immortal
gods, and also the disgraceful mockeries of the theatres, and their
own most ardent lust after, and most sweet pleasure in these things,
whilst they have concealed from them that Plato, with the gravity of
a philosopher, gave it as his opinion that all these things ought to
be removed from a well-regulated republic; so that the good gods are
now compelled, through such messengers, to know the evil doings of the
most wicked beings, that is to say, of the messengers themselves, and
are not allowed to know the good deeds of the philosophers, though the
former are for the injury, but these latter for the honour of the gods
themselves?