Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which
the Stoics laboured to make such distinctions among the causes of
things as should enable them to rescue certain things from the dominion
of necessity, and to subject others to it. Among those things which
they wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills,
knowing that they would not be free if subjected to necessity. For
if that is to be called _our necessity_ which is not in our power,
but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect,--as, for
instance, the necessity of death,--it is manifest that our wills by
which we live uprightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for
we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly
not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself,--for if
we will, it _is_; if we will not, it _is_ not,--for we should not will
if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according
to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such
a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we
should have any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of
our will. For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of
God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary that God
should live for ever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power
diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error,--for
this is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for
Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly called
omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He
is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on
account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall
Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some
things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say
that it is necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in
so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still
subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. Our
wills, therefore, _exist_ as _wills_, and do themselves whatever we
do by willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling. But
when any one suffers anything, being unwilling, by the will of another,
even in that case will retains its essential validity,--we do not mean
the will of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it
into the power of God. For if a will should simply exist, but not be
able to do what it wills, it would be overborne by a more powerful
will. Nor would this be the case unless there had existed will, and
that not the will of the other party, but the will of him who willed,
but was not able to accomplish what he willed. Therefore, whatsoever
a man suffers contrary to his own will, he ought not to attribute to
the will of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to
His will who gives power to wills. It is not the case, therefore, that
because God foreknew what would be in the power of our wills, there is
for that reason nothing in the power of our wills. For he who foreknew
this did not foreknow nothing. Moreover, if He who foreknew what would
be in the power of our wills did not foreknow nothing, but something,
assuredly, even though He did foreknow, there is something in the
power of our wills. Therefore we are by no means compelled, either,
retaining the prescience of God, to take away the freedom of the will,
or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that He is prescient of
future things, which is impious. But we embrace both. We faithfully
and sincerely confess both. The former, that we may believe well; the
latter, that we may live well. For he lives ill who does not believe
well concerning God. Wherefore, be it far from us, in order to maintain
our freedom, to deny the prescience of Him by whose help we are or
shall be free. Consequently, it is not in vain that laws are enacted,
and that reproaches, exhortations, praises, and vituperations are had
recourse to; for these also He foreknew, and they are of great avail,
even as great as He foreknew that they would be of. Prayers, also, are
of avail to procure those things which He foreknew that He would grant
to those who offered them; and with justice have rewards been appointed
for good deeds, and punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore
sin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be doubted
but that it is the man himself who sins when he does sin, because He,
whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew not that fate, or fortune,
or something else would sin, but that the man himself would sin, who,
if he wills not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this
did God foreknow.