emotions._
Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental
emotions, which the Greeks call πάθη, while some of our own writers,
as Cicero, call them perturbations,[331] some affections, and some,
to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even
the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and
controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains
them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists
and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder
of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion
that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero,
in his book _De Finibus_, shows that the Stoics are here at variance
with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality;
for the Stoics decline to apply the term "goods" to external and bodily
advantages,[332] because they reckon that the only good is virtue,
the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other
philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and
do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of
virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem.
And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called
goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both
parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves
merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this
question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or
wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of
things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the
words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the
Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other
proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state
but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive
erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates,
in his work entitled _Noctes Atticæ_,[333] that he once made a voyage
with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and
with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed
and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with
terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves
threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would
be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as
soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one
of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter
the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with
fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction.
But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the
Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the
same character, answered, "You had no cause for anxiety for the soul
of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul
of Aristippus." The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius
asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy
him, what was the reason of his fear? And he, willing to instruct a man
so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet
a book of Epictetus the Stoic,[334] in which doctrines were advanced
which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the
founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in
this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions
made on the soul by external objects which they call _phantasiæ_,
and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or
when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by
alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the
soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear,
or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of
reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts
these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this
consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference
between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's
mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the
wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains
with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things
which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what
Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the
sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could,
not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and,
I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no
difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that
of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations,
for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the
wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean
by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise
man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this
reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the
impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer
to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we
need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those
things which he thought he was forthwith to lose, life and bodily
safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray
his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this
mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life
and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to
destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good,
as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist
that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about
words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether
goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than
the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while,
though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both
parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality
or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they
would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and
security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And
thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no
perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though
they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it
rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them,
administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas
by Virgil when he says,
"He stands immovable by tears,
Nor tenderest words with pity hears."[335]