the gods as beings entirely good and the friends of virtue._
Therefore, although in many other important respects they differ from
us, nevertheless with respect to this particular point of difference,
which I have just stated, as it is one of great moment, and the
question on hand concerns it, I will first ask them to what gods
they think that sacred rites are to be performed,--to the good or to
the bad, or to both the good and the bad? But we have the opinion of
Plato affirming that all the gods are good, and that there is not
one of the gods bad. It follows, therefore, that these are to be
performed to the good, for then they are performed to gods; for if
they are not good, neither are they gods. Now, if this be the case
(for what else ought we to believe concerning the gods?), certainly
it explodes the opinion that the bad gods are to be propitiated by
sacred rites in order that they may not harm us, but the good gods
are to be invoked in order that they may assist us. For there are no
bad gods, and it is to the good that, as they say, the due honour of
such rites is to be paid. Of what character, then, are those gods who
love scenic displays, even demanding that a place be given them among
divine things, and that they be exhibited in their honour? The power
of these gods proves that they exist, but their liking such things
proves that they are bad. For it is well known what Plato's opinion
was concerning scenic plays. He thinks that the poets themselves,
because they have composed songs so unworthy of the majesty and
goodness of the gods, ought to be banished from the state. Of what
character, therefore, are those gods who contend with Plato himself
about those scenic plays? He does not suffer the gods to be defamed
by false crimes; the gods command those same crimes to be celebrated
in their own honour.
In fine, when they ordered these plays to be inaugurated, they not
only demanded base things, but also did cruel things, taking from
Titus Latinius his son, and sending a disease upon him because he
had refused to obey them, which they removed when he had fulfilled
their commands. Plato, however, bad though they were, did not
think they were to be feared; but, holding to his opinion with the
utmost firmness and constancy, does not hesitate to remove from a
well-ordered state all the sacrilegious follies of the poets, with
which these gods are delighted because they themselves are impure.
But Labeo places this same Plato (as I have mentioned already in the
second book[307]) among the demi-gods. Now Labeo thinks that the
bad deities are to be propitiated with bloody victims, and by fasts
accompanied with the same, but the good deities with plays, and all
other things which are associated with joyfulness. How comes it,
then, that the demi-god Plato so persistently dares to take away
those pleasures, because he deems them base, not from the demi-gods
but from the gods, and these the good gods? And, moreover, those very
gods themselves do certainly refute the opinion of Labeo, for they
showed themselves in the case of Latinius to be not only wanton and
sportive, but also cruel and terrible. Let the Platonists, therefore,
explain these things to us, since, following the opinion of their
master, they think that all the gods are good and honourable, and
friendly to the virtues of the wise, holding it unlawful to think
otherwise concerning any of the gods. We will explain it, say they.
Let us then attentively listen to them.