the same._
It has already, in the preceding book, been shown how the two cities
originated among the angels. Before I speak of the creation of man,
and show how the cities took their rise, so far as regards the race
of rational mortals, I see that I must first, so far as I can, adduce
what may demonstrate that it is not incongruous and unsuitable to
speak of a society composed of angels and men together; so that there
are not four cities or societies,--two, namely, of angels, and as
many of men,--but rather two in all, one composed of the good, the
other of the wicked, angels or men indifferently.
That the contrary propensities in good and bad angels have arisen,
not from a difference in their nature and origin, since God, the
good Author and Creator of all essences, created them both, but from
a difference in their wills and desires, it is impossible to doubt.
While some stedfastly continued in that which was the common good of
all, namely, in God Himself, and in His eternity, truth, and love;
others, being enamoured rather of their own power, as if they could
be their own good, lapsed to this private good of their own, from
that higher and beatific good which was common to all, and, bartering
the lofty dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the most
assured verity for the slyness of vanity, uniting love for factious
partisanship, they became proud, deceived, envious. The cause,
therefore, of the blessedness of the good is adherence to God. And so
the cause of the others' misery will be found in the contrary, that
is, in their not adhering to God. Wherefore, if when the question
is asked, why are the former blessed, it is rightly answered,
because they adhere to God; and when it is asked, why are the latter
miserable, it is rightly answered, because they do not adhere to
God,--then there is no other good for the rational or intellectual
creature save God only. Thus, though it is not every creature that
can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and things of that kind
have not this capacity), yet that creature which has the capacity
cannot be blessed of itself, since it is created out of nothing, but
only by Him by whom it has been created. For it is blessed by the
possession of that whose loss makes it miserable. He, then, who is
blessed not in another, but in himself, cannot be miserable, because
he cannot lose himself.
Accordingly we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one,
true, blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good
because from Him, yet mutable because made not out of Him, but out of
nothing. Although, therefore, they are not the supreme good, for God
is a greater good, yet those mutable things which can adhere to the
immutable good, and so be blessed, are very good; for so completely
is He their good, that without Him they cannot but be wretched. And
the other created things in the universe are not better on this
account, that they cannot be miserable. For no one would say that
the other members of the body are superior to the eyes, because they
cannot be blind. But as the sentient nature, even when it feels
pain, is superior to the stony, which can feel none, so the rational
nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than that which lacks
reason or feeling, and can therefore experience no misery. And since
this is so, then in this nature which has been created so excellent,
that though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness
by adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God; and since it is
not satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and cannot be thus
blessed save in God,--in this nature, I say, not to adhere to God, is
manifestly a fault.[520] Now every fault injures the nature, and is
consequently contrary to the nature. The creature, therefore, which
cleaves to God, differs from those who do not, not by nature, but
by fault; and yet by this very fault the nature itself is proved to
be very noble and admirable. For that nature is certainly praised,
the fault of which is justly blamed. For we justly blame the fault
because it mars the praiseworthy nature. As, then, when we say that
blindness is a defect of the eyes, we prove that sight belongs to the
nature of the eyes; and when we say that deafness is a defect of the
ears, hearing is thereby proved to belong to their nature;--so, when
we say that it is a fault of the angelic creature that it does not
cleave to God, we hereby most plainly declare that it pertained to
its nature to cleave to God. And who can worthily conceive or express
how great a glory that is, to cleave to God, so as to live to Him, to
draw wisdom from Him, to delight in Him, and to enjoy this so great
good, without death, error, or grief? And thus, since every vice is
an injury of the nature, that very vice of the wicked angels, their
departure from God, is sufficient proof that God created their nature
so good, that it is an injury to it not to be with God.